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Does Public Support for Rehabilitation Really Mirror 
that for Repression? 
Cracking a Deep-Rooted Criminological Myth 
 
Abstract 
For over a century scholars and practitioners have conceived of rehabilitation as the 
progressive mirror image of repression. Elaborating on previous warnings and anomalous 
findings, a representative survey of the Dutch population (N=1,892) points out that this 
received view is flawed. When measured separately, no significant correlation exists between 
support for rehabilitation and support for repression, rehabilitation is equally popular among 
the constituencies of conservative and progressive political parties, and no negative 
relationship exists between rehabilitation and authoritarianism. Abolition rather than 
rehabilitation proves to constitute the progressive opposite of repression. By way of 
conclusion, we discuss the remarkable persistence of the myth cracked in this paper, even in 
the face of convincing earlier contradictory evidence. 
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Does Public Support for Rehabilitation Really Mirror 
that for Repression?*
Cracking a Deep-Rooted Criminological Myth*
 
 
“I was offered a compromise, which I wouldn’t accept.” “What kind of 
compromise?” “Re-education. Reformation of the character. The code-
word was counseling.” “And are you so perfect that you can’t do with a 
little counseling?” “It reminds me too much of Mao’s China. 
Recantation, self-criticism, public apology. I’m old-fashioned, I would 
prefer simply to be put against the wall and shot. Have done with it” 
(Coetzee 1999: 66, emphasis in original). 
 
Introduction 
 
For at least a century, social scientists have conceived of rehabilitation (or resocialisation, 
reintegration, or treatment) as the progressive mirror image of repression (or retribution or 
punishment) (e.g., Durkheim 1906, 1934; Mead 1918; Garland 2005). No less than a quarter 
of a century ago, (Duffee & Ritti 1980: 349) have already argued that this deep-rooted 
                                                 
* This project has been enabled by grants of ‘Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam’, the Sociology department’s research programme ‘Social Problems in 
Contemporary Modernity’ under the supervision of professor Godfried Engbersen, and by a 
substantial discount on the collection of the data by CentERdata of the University of Tilburg. 
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conception is seriously flawed, however: ‘While correctional practitioners and academicians 
alike have often conceptualized retribution (or punishment) and treatment (or rehabilitation) 
as opposites along one dimension, statistical analysis of the public data indicates that such is 
not the case. […] As remarkable as it might seem, retribution and rehabilitation seem to be 
values that must be handled, accommodated, or satisfied independently of each other’ 
(emphasis in original). Duffee and Ritti’s warnings have not had much impact on research 
practices, however, and the habit of conceiving of repression and rehabilitation as each 
other’s mirror image is alive as ever today (as noticed as well, e.g., by Applegate, Cullen, & 
Fisher 1997; Moon et al. 2000; Sundt, Cullen, & Applegate 1998). Therefore, in this paper, 
we study whether this intellectual habit is as problematical as Duffee and Ritti held it to be or 
whether their warnings have been neglected rightly. We thus study whether rehabilitation 
really constitutes the mirror image of repression and, if not, how to explain this circumstance. 
We do so by means of an analysis of survey data collected for this very purpose among a 
sample of the Dutch population. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The deep-rooted conception of rehabilitation as the progressive mirror image of repression 
gives rise to a variety of debatable measurement strategies in the relevant research literature. 
American public opinion polls, for instance, often rely on a limited number of questions 
(typically as few as one or two) about repressive measures. If a substantial part of the 
population supports those measures – and indeed, typically a majority does –, this is taken to 
indicate that only limited support for rehabilitation exists, thus effectively inferring rejection 
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of rehabilitation from support for repression. But of course, as Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate 
(2000: 6-8) rightly comment in their review of the relevant research literature, ‘progressive 
opinions cannot be discovered if they are not measured by an opinion survey’ (see also, 
Matthews 2005: 192). Another debatable measurement strategy is asking respondents 
whether they prefer either punishment or rehabilitation, assuming the former to indicate 
‘punitivity’ and the latter its absence (De Konink & Scheepers 1998). In a more elaborate 
version, support for repressive measures (e.g., capital punishment, raising of sentences, 
penalizing minors as if they were adults, et cetera) is taken to indicate high levels of 
punitivity, support for rehabilitative measures (e.g., re-education, treatment, providing a 
house or a job, et cetera) is taken to indicate low levels of punitivity, and equal support for 
both types of measures is taken to indicate a middle position (e.g., Berghuis & Essers 1986; 
Van Dijk 1985; Steinmetz, Klijn, & Van Andel 1984). All of those measurement strategies 
share the assumption that rehabilitation and repression are polar opposites. 
A study by Langworthy & Whitehead (1986: 580) unintentionally raises doubts about 
whether those established research practices can stand up against critical scrutiny. Having 
asked their respondents to choose between punishing criminals and rehabilitating them into 
useful, honest citizens, no less then eleven percent ticked both options (and thus needed to be 
excluded from the analysis due to missing values). Respondents apparently experienced the 
opposition constructed by the researchers as artificial and otherworldly. What is even more 
telling, is that the researchers had explicitly instructed their respondents to select no more 
than one option. Without this instruction, even more than eleven percent might have ticked 
both options. Conceptualizing support for punishment and rehabilitation as opposites seems 
not without problems, then. Indeed, a recent review of research into Americans’ ideas about 
crime concludes that ‘… the central tendency in public opinion is to be punitive and 
progressive – to endorse the use of a balanced response to lawbreakers, which includes an 
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effort to do justice, protect society, and reform offenders’ (Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate 2000: 
9, 60, emphasis in original, see also Flanagan 1996: 92; Matthews 2005: 191). 
Correlations between support for repression and for rehabilitation, measured as 
separate scales, raise questions that are more direct. Those correlations vary from weakly 
negative (Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher 1997; Carroll et al. 1987; Duffee & Ritti 1980; Ortet-
Fabregat & Pérez 1992) to weakly positive (De Keijser 2000; XXXXX). Due to differences 
between studies with respect to place, time and sample composition, it is not easy to pinpoint 
the causes of the variation that exists, but the conceptualization and measurement of support 
for rehabilitation seems to make a difference. Weakly negative correlations with support for 
punishment are found if rehabilitation is conceived of ‘structurally’ (i.e., as improving 
offenders’ life chances) (Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher 1997; Carroll et al. 1987; Duffee & 
Ritti 1980; Ortet-Fabregat & Pérez 1992). Weakly positive ones are found if it is conceived 
of either ‘interpersonally’ (i.e., as strengthening perpetrators’ social ties with community) or 
‘psychologically’ (i.e., as treatment of offenders’ destructive emotions, ideas, and behavior) 
(De Keijser 2000; XXXXX). If we follow Lynch's (2000: 45) argument that rehabilitation is a 
three-dimensional concept that incorporates all of those three dimensions – i.e., a structural, 
an interpersonal, and a psychological one –, support for rehabilitation is thus expected to 
yield a non-significant correlation with support for repression (Hypothesis 1). 
If rehabilitation does not constitute the progressive opposite of repression, what does? 
From the postmodern perspective of Foucault, the only relevant difference between them is 
rehabilitation’s greater effectiveness: obedience no longer needs to be imposed ‘from 
without’, but rather emerges from a deeply felt desire to conform, effectively washing out 
perpetrators’ will to deviate (Ritzer 1997; Rose 1988). Foucault thus emphasises what 
repression and rehabilitation have in common: the acceptance of the necessity to socially 
control individuals (see also, Matthews 2005: 180). This suggests that it is not so much 
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rehabilitation that constitutes the opposite of repression, but rather the abandonment of 
attempts at social control. Indeed, abolition – i.e., restriction of criminal law and its 
enforcement – constitutes the logical consequence of what Garland (2005: 479/80) refers to 
as a ‘liberalism of fear’. The latter ‘insists upon robust civil liberties as a necessary bulwark 
against the possibility of state violence and the over-reach of state officials’. A ‘conservatism 
of fear’, on the other hand, is born ‘out of a fear of disorder, of unruly people, of the threat of 
criminal violence and victimization. The politics to which this gives rise takes the state to be 
a protector rather than a threat, and calls upon state officials always to do more rather than 
less to control individuals and repress troublemakers’ (emphasis in original). If, indeed, 
abolition rather than rehabilitation constitutes the mirror image of repression, we should find 
a strong negative relationship between support for abolition and support for repression 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Some of those who reject the received view of rehabilitation and repression as 
opposite alternatives nevertheless assume that the former constitutes the progressive mirror 
image of the latter (e.g., Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate 2000: 9). This assumption is quite 
remarkable. After all, if repression and rehabilitation do not constitute opposite alternatives, 
they are also unlikely to receive support at the conservative and progressive ends of the 
political spectrum, respectively. To be sure, it is virtually uncontested that repression is 
especially favoured at the conservative end of the political spectrum (Meloen 1983; 
Stinchcombe et al. 1980; Zeisel & Gallup 1989; XXXXX). Rehabilitation is lacking such a 
clear ideological profile, however. It does not consistently generate most support at the 
progressive end of the political spectrum. If it is conceived of either ‘interpersonally’ or 
‘psychologically’ (in Lynch’s terms), it proves as popular among conservatives as among 
progressives (Horwitz 1984; Zedner 1994: 232; Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate 2000: 40; 
XXXXX). Our argument in the foregoing rather suggests that abolition is politically 
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contested, with the progressive and conservative ends of the political spectrum characterized 
by support and rejection, respectively. We expect, in short, that abolition and repression 
receive most support at the progressive and conservative ends of the political spectrum, 
respectively, while rehabilitation lacks a clear ideological haven (Hypothesis 3). 
If the foregoing hypotheses are confirmed, the difficult question of why rehabilitation 
is lacking a distinct ideological profile emerges. How, then, to explain this remarkable 
circumstance, that so strikingly contradicts the received view? What may be decisive is that 
repression and rehabilitation are neither completely different, as the received view has always 
assumed, nor basically identical, as Foucault’s postmodern position holds. Obviously, both 
positions are not so much wrong, but rather one-sided. What repression and rehabilitation 
have in common is that, unlike abolition, they both take the necessity of social control for 
granted – the shared point of departure that Foucault emphasises. They are not identical, 
however, because repression rests on the assumption that human beings are evil by nature, 
whereas rehabilitation’s ambition to socialise people into new identities and life styles relies 
on the assumption that human nature is essentially pliable, open and undetermined (Bauman 
2000; Lynch 2000; Rose 1988). Repression assumes that the causes of crime reside within 
criminals, who are seen as essentially evil people that need to be punished for their misdeeds. 
Rehabilitation instead assumes that criminals can be reformed, because human nature is 
essentially open and pliable: bad social circumstances can make any person a criminal, just 
like favourable conditions can transform a criminal into a decent citizen. Those contrasting 
beliefs about human nature underlie the deep-rooted conviction that repression and 
rehabilitation are each other’s mirror images. 
Research into internal and external attribution of crime suggests that, indeed, 
repression and rehabilitation are polar opposites in this respect. As it happens, (internal) 
attribution of crime to personal traits proves to result in support for repression and a rejection 
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of rehabilitation (Cullen et al. 1985; Carroll et al. 1987; Rood-Pijpers 1988; Timberlake, 
Lock, & Rasinski 2003), belief in human malleability seems to produce support for 
rehabilitation and rejection of repression (Rose 1988; Bauman 2000; Lynch 2000; Vollebergh 
1991; Meloen, Van der Linden, & De Witte 1996; XXXXX) and rehabilitation appears more 
popular in case of young offenders, because those are believed to be more malleable than 
adult ones (Moon et al. 2000: 45). Internal crime attribution is thus expected to affect support 
for repression positively and support for rehabilitation negatively (Hypothesis 4) and external 
crime attribution to affect support for repression negatively and support for rehabilitation 
positively (Hypothesis 5). 
Those dynamics of attribution suggest why rehabilitation fails to receive more support 
from progressives than from conservatives. Just as conservative political thought, after all, 
repression assumes both the desirability of social control and a conception of human nature as 
evil (e.g., Middendorp 1991). This makes it completely understandable that conservatives 
tend to support repression, while it does not receive much support at the progressive end of 
the political spectrum. Although rehabilitation shares with repression the assumption that 
social control is necessary, it simultaneously rejects the conservative conception of human 
nature as evil. Precisely this disjunction of two ideas that tend to go together in political 
thought may be responsible for the circumstance that, contrary to what is commonly 
assumed, rehabilitation is no more favourite at the progressive end of the political spectrum 
than at the conservative end. In this case, after all, those two ideas work in opposite 
directions, thus preventing a favourite status of rehabilitation in progressive circles. We 
expect, in short, that the expected positive effect of a conservative pattern of attribution (i.e., 
strongly internal and weakly external) on support for repression is further reinforced by a 
conservative preference for social control. A progressive pattern of attribution’s expected 
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positive effect on support for rehabilitation is expected to be cancelled out by a typically 
progressive dislike of social control, however (Hypothesis 6). 
 
Data and measurement 
 
Data 
We have tested our questionnaire in a small pilot study with fifty-nine respondents (mostly 
sociology students, acquaintances, and relatives). Although this pilot has led us to drop, 
change, or rephrase particular items, radical changes to the questionnaire proved unnecessary. 
It has therefore been used to collect data among a nationally representative sample of 
respondents aged 18 years and older, maintained by CentERdata (University of Tilburg, The 
Netherlands). Panel members fill out questionnaires of social scientists on a regular basis by 
means of an Internet connection made available by CentERdata. The data collection for the 
current project has taken place in the spring of 2005, yielding a 71 percent response rate and a 
sample size of 1,892 respondents. 
Women, the young, and the poorly educated are somewhat underrepresented. We 
have decided not to correct for this by mechanically applying a weighting procedure, because 
the deviations from the population are only marginal, because the application of weights may 
worsen rather than solve the problem of bias (with no way to find out which of both occurs), 
and because none of our hypotheses relates to gender, education, or age.  
 
Measurement 
Support for repression is measured by means of six Likert items (‘agree strongly’ through 
‘disagree strongly’ and a separate ‘don’t know’ category) that together constitute a reliable 
scale (Cronbach’s α=0.85, see Table 1 for details). 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Support for rehabilitation is measured with twelve items, four for each of Lynch’s three 
dimensions discussed above: 1) improvement of offenders’ life chances, 2) strengthening 
perpetrators’ social relationships with community, and 3) treatment of offenders’ destructive 
emotions, ideas, and behaviour. As Table 2 demonstrates, those twelve items produce a 
reliable scale (Cronbach’s α=0.75). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Support for abolition is also measured by means of Likert-type items. In this case, six items 
are used, that indicate either the extent to which one approves of the abolishment of 
prohibitions or the extent to which one disapproves of strengthening the powers of criminal 
investigation. Although this scale’s reliability is only modest (Cronbach’s α=0.56), all factor 
loadings exceed 0.45 (Table 3).  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
We use political party preference and a scale for authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950) to 
measure the distinction between conservatism and progressiveness. Political party preference 
is measured with a question into the political party one would vote for ‘if parliamentary 
elections would be held tomorrow’. Following Budge & Klingemann (2001), the Christian-
Democratic (CDA) (13.2%), Orthodox-Christian (SGP, ChristenUnie) (6.4%), Conservatives 
(VVD) (10.7%) and Rightist-Populist (LPF, Groep Wilders) (5.3%) parties are treated as 
conservative and the Liberal-Democratic (D66) (3.6%), Social-Democratic (PvdA) (19.0%), 
Socialist (SP) (9.7%), and Green (GroenLinks) (8.7%) parties as progressive.1
Authoritarianism is measured with seven items, selected from a short version of the 
classical F-scale (Adorno et al. 1950), that together constitute a reliable scale (Cronbach’s 
α=0.73).2  
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 Internal crime attribution is measured by means of seven Likert items that together 
constitute a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α=0.76). Three of those items relate to faith in human 
malleability, three to the belief that offenders are predestined to crime and one to the 
conviction that offenders and non-offenders are two different sorts of people.3 External crime 
attribution is also measured with seven Likert-items, three of which relate to attribution to 
unfavourable economic conditions and four to unfavourable social conditions (Cronbach’s 
α=0.76).4
Victimization and fear of victimization are included as controls. An index based on the 
number of times a respondent has been a victim of vandalism, theft, or violence during the 
previous year (‘never’, ‘yes, once’, ‘yes, twice’, ‘yes, more than twice’, or ‘do not know’) 
measures the former.5 An index based on respondent’s estimation of the likelihood that he or 
she will become a victim of vandalism, theft, or violence in the year that lies ahead (‘very 
small’, ‘small’, ‘not small, not great’, ‘great’, ‘very great’, or ‘do not know’) measures the 
latter. 
Age, gender, degree of urbanization, and education are included as additional 
controls, because ‘available research suggests that females, the young, and the educated are 
generally the least punitive in their attitudes toward criminal sanctioning […]’ (Cullen et al. 
1985: 312, see however: Schwartz, Guo, & Kerbs 1993: 11; McCorkle 1993: 243). Age is 
measured in years, ranging from 18 through 91 and 51.6 percent of the respondents is male 
and 48.4 female. The highest completed level of education has been coded into six ordinal 
categories: 1) primary education (5.1%), 2) lower secondary education (26.7%), 3) higher 
secondary education (13.8%), 4) intermediary tertiary education (20.4%), 5) college (23.3%), 
and 6) university (10.7%). Finally, degree of urbanization has been measured with a single 
question about the extent to which one lives in an urban environment: 1) not at all (16.9%), 2) 
little (21.4%), 3) somewhat (21.6%), 4) much (24.3%), 5) very much (15.9%). 
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 Results 
 
We test our first two hypotheses, that both address relationships between support for 
rehabilitation, repression and abolition, by means of correlations (Table 4). If rehabilitation 
would mirror repression, as assumed in the received view, we would expect to find a negative 
correlation between the two. This is clearly not the case, however. Consistent with our first 
hypothesis, no significant relationship exists between the two. Therefore, in striking contrast 
to the received view, favouring a repressive approach to criminals does not make people 
more (or less, for that matter) likely to approve of rehabilitation. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Our second hypothesis predicts that abolition rather than rehabilitation mirrors 
repression. Whereas support for repression does not correlate at all with support for 
rehabilitation, the former does correlate strongly and negatively with support for abolition 
(Table 4). Consistent with our second hypothesis, then, abolition rather than rehabilitation 
constitutes the mirror image of repression. Moreover, no relationship exists between 
rehabilitation and abolition, underscoring that although those two are clearly fundamentally 
different, they are definitely not diametrically opposed.  
This brings us to the question whether the received view is also wrong in assuming 
that rehabilitation is particularly popular among the constituencies of progressive political 
parties, as our third hypothesis predicts. Table 5 presents the relevant findings. Although, 
hardly surprising, repression is especially supported by the constituencies of conservative 
political parties, rehabilitation is not particularly popular among those of progressive ones. It 
is in fact equally popular at both ends of the political spectrum. Instead, abolition once again 
constitutes the opposite of repression: it mirrors the latter in that it is especially popular 
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among the constituencies of progressive political parties. Although those findings are once 
again striking given the received view, they are nevertheless perfectly consistent with the 
research findings discussed above and convincingly confirm our third hypothesis. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
How to explain the remarkable circumstance that rehabilitation is equally popular at both 
ends of the political spectrum? As argued above, this may be due to the circumstance that 
despite its progressive conception of human nature, it also takes the necessity of social 
control for granted – a conservative rather than a progressive ideological tenet. To study 
whether this is the case, we have conducted four multiple regression analyses, all of them 
including the statistical controls mentioned above. For both repression and rehabilitation, the 
first model assesses the effect of authoritarianism (replacing political party preference here) 
and the second one also includes crime attribution. 
Hardly surprising after the foregoing, of course, high levels of authoritarianism 
increase support for repression and fail to affect support for rehabilitation. This once again 
confirms their ideological profiles as already demonstrated above. Consistent with this, 
authoritarianism affects abolition strongly and negatively (not shown in Table 6), once again 
confirming that it, rather than rehabilitation, constitutes repression’s progressive alternative. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
As Hypothesis 4 predicts, internal crime attribution produces support for repression and 
aversion to rehabilitation. Hypothesis 5 receives only mixed support, however. Although, as 
expected, external crime attribution strongly increases support for rehabilitation, it does not 
detract from support for repression. The absence of this negative relationship between 
external attribution and support for repression is puzzling, especially because Carroll et al. 
(1987: 113, 116) also failed to find it, a circumstance that makes it unlikely that we are 
dealing with a mere coincidence.6 Because both effects of internal crime attribution are 
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consistent with our hypothesis, those findings nevertheless enable us to conclude that those 
who support repression embrace a conception of human nature as essentially evil, whereas 
those who favour rehabilitation reject such a conception.  
 Finally, to test Hypothesis 6 we need to assess how the effect of authoritarianism 
changes after introducing internal and external attribution in the analysis. As to repression, it 
is clear that a conception of human nature as evil accounts for part of authoritarianism’s 
positive effect. Hypothesis 6 is not confirmed for rehabilitation, however. Notwithstanding 
the relatively strong and predicted effects of internal (negative) and external attribution 
(positive), their inclusion does not change the non-significant effect of authoritarianism into a 
positive one. This means that, contrary to our expectations, the remarkable absence of a 
progressive ideological profile of rehabilitation is not caused by a progressive dislike of the 
conservative tenet of the necessity of social control. 
Table 6 also reveals a finding that, although tangential to our purposes in this paper, 
nevertheless merits attention. As it happens, contrary to what is often assumed, victimization 
does not induce support for repression. Although this may seem surprising, in fact it is not. 
As it happens, any number of studies indicates that personal experience with crime has 
negligible effects on crime-related opinions (Taylor, Scheppele, & Stinchcombe 1979; 
Stinchcombe et al. 1980; Tyler & Weber 1982; Cullen et al. 1985; Van Dijk 1985; Berghuis 
& Essers 1986; Langworthy & Whitehead 1986; Carroll et al. 1987; McCorkle 1993; Sundt, 
Cullen, & Applegate 1998; Dekker & De Waal 1999; Kury, Obergfell-Fuchs, & Smartt 2002: 
98, 101; Mayhew & Van Kesteren 2002: 79-84). We will come back to this finding in our 
conclusion. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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 Many criminologists and policy makers conceive of public support for repression and 
rehabilitation as two diametrically opposed options. It is thus assumed that severe punishment 
necessarily goes against the will of those who are in favour of rehabilitation and that the latter 
meets with resistance among the constituencies of conservative political parties. Those ideas 
have persisted ever since Duffee and Ritti, no less than a quarter of a century ago, pointed out 
how deeply problematic they are. Our analysis underscores that Duffee and Ritti were right. 
Support for repression and rehabilitation do not exclude one another at all and rehabilitation 
is equally popular among the constituencies of conservative political parties as among those 
of progressive ones. Duffee and Ritti’s warning, issued a quarter of a century ago, was fully 
justified, then, and the habit of conceiving of support for repression and for rehabilitation as 
diametrically opposed options should have been abandoned long ago. 
Abolition rather than rehabilitation constitutes the progressive mirror image of 
repression. Because abolition is especially popular in progressive circles, the latter are the 
most likely critics of plans to punish criminals more harshly. Conservatives are most likely to 
oppose a policy of abolition. A policy aimed at rehabilitation, however, is unlikely to lead to 
polarization between conservatives and progressives, because neither particularly likes or 
dislikes this type of policy. Unfortunately, it remains unclear why it is that rehabilitation is 
lacking a distinct ideological homeland. Perhaps this is due to our operationalisation of the 
necessity of social control. Indeed, although authoritarianism and traditionalism are strongly 
correlated and both carried by the poorly educated and the elderly (e.g., Middendorp 1991; 
XXXXX ), recent research points out that it may nevertheless be necessary to distinguish the 
two carefully (De Koster & Van Der Waal, under review). Although they both emphasise a 
need for social control and both conceive of human nature negatively (and are as such both 
disliked by political progressives), moral traditionalism may nevertheless be more conducive 
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to support for rehabilitation than authoritarianism, thus effectively washing out any 
progressive sympathies for rehabilitation that emerge from optimism about human nature. We 
consider it a key issue for future empirical research to find out whether rehabilitation is more 
popular among moral traditionalists than among authoritarians. 
Hutton (2005: 246) has recently argued that the relationship between support for 
repression and for rehabilitation constitutes a mere methodological issue. His analysis 
demonstrates that Scots are punitive with respect to general issues of crime and criminal 
justice, but are simultaneously in favour of rehabilitative measures when asked to give 
sentences for specific crimes and when asked to take the costs of sanctions into account. He 
concludes from those findings: ‘Survey questions, issues framed in a structural way and the 
absence of information tend to generate more punitive responses, while methods which allow 
respondents to interact and engage in dialogue, issues framed in individual cases and the 
provision of more information, tend to generate more liberal attitudes’. Indeed, earlier studies 
have also found that broad and general questions instead of detailed questions about 
punishing specific offenders tends to increase respondents’ punitivity (Cullen, Fisher, & 
Applegate 2000: 61). Nevertheless, our study has demonstrated that even if only general 
questions are used, support for repression and support for rehabilitation are not the opposites 
they are typically held to be. 
How to explain the persistence of the widespread misconstruction addressed in this 
paper among social scientists surveying the public, even though quite a few pertinent findings 
indicated that it was wrong? While, of course, comparative studies convincingly demonstrate 
that what counts as crime varies between social contexts (Douglas & Waksler 1982), Coutin 
(2005) observes that this awareness of the social construction of crime is the exception rather 
than the rule among criminologists. This may well be a result of criminologists’ typical 
embedding in or dependence on the system of criminal justice, a circumstance that easily 
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produces lack of intellectual distance, reification of conceptions of crime as codified in penal 
law (Schinkel 2002) and an overlooking of abolition as a policy option besides repression and 
rehabilitation. 
This same blind spot for the social construction of crime may also account for a 
remarkable ‘instrumental’ bias among many of those who study crime-related public opinion. 
As it happens, our study has replicated the familiar finding that victimization does not cause 
support for repression (see also Tyler & Weber 1982). Yet, it seems as if many a 
criminologist cannot believe or accept this and hence insists on attempting to ground ideas 
about crime and punishment in ‘objective’ circumstances and personal interests by assuming 
instrumental reasons for supporting repression. This tendency is all the more remarkable 
since many studies, including our own, have convincingly demonstrated how important moral 
worldviews are for understanding ideas about crime and punishment (see also Tyler & Weber 
1982). The blind spot that seems to stem from criminologists’ embedding in or dependence 
on the criminal justice system makes it fully understandable that the cracking of 
criminological myths such as the one discussed in the current paper fails to affect established 
research practices. 
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
 
1. The remaining response categories are treated as missing values: Other (namely: ‘Blank’, 
‘Party for Elderly’, ‘Party for Animals’, ‘Peter R. de Vries’, or ‘Van Buitenen’) (0.8%), ‘I 
would not vote’ (3.5%), ‘I am not allowed to vote’ (0.7%), and ‘I do not know (yet)’ (18.6%). 
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2. Those seven items are: (1) “Because of the many opinions on good and bad, it is not clear 
what to do” (21.1; 0.71); (2) “If people would talk less and work harder, everything would 
improve. (32.0; 0.65); (3) “There are two kinds of people: strong and weak (20.8; 0.64); (4) 
“Most people are disappointing once one gets to know them better (10.9; 0.64); (5) “Our 
social problems would largely be solved when we could expel criminals, anti-socials, and 
morons from society in one way or the other (13.5; 0.59); (6) “Because of fast changes, it is 
difficult to know what is good and bad (25.4; 0.56); (7) “What we need are less laws and 
institutions and more brave, never-ceasing, and devoted leaders in which the people can have 
confidence (54.8; 0.54). 
 
3. With the percentage “agree (strongly)” and the loading on the first factor in brackets, the 
seven items that measure internal crime attribution are: (1) “Most inmates are born criminals” 
(9.5; 0.72); (2) “Once a thief, always a thief” (11.7; 0.70); (3) “Criminality is hereditary” 
(7.0; 0.69); (4) “Inheritance determines human behavior largely” (32.3; 0.67); (5) “Criminals 
are a special kind of people” (41.1; 0.62); (6) “If you are born poor, you will remain poor all 
your life” (10.1; 0.55), (7) “Personal characteristics do not change” (45.1; 0.53). 
 
4. With the percentage “agree (strongly)” and the loading on the first factor in brackets, the 
seven items that measure external crime attribution are: (1) “Criminality is often caused by 
family problems” (43.7; 0.75); (2) “Criminals often come from broken homes” (41.2; 0.71) 
(3) “Most criminals lack schooling and education” (48.1; 0.68); (4) “Unemployment is an 
important cause of criminality” (58.7; 0.64); (5) “Abused children often drift astray” (30.5; 
0.59); (6) “Parents who neglect their children contribute much to criminality” (79.5; 0.59); 
(7) “Poverty actuates people to criminal behavior” (50.2; 0.52). 
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5. The frequency distribution of the number of times a respondent has become victimized is as 
follows (percentages): (1) never (75.4); (2) one time (15.3), (3) two times (5.4), (4) more than 
two times (3.9). 
 
6. It is important to point out that we find no support for (Garland 2005); see also (Hutton 
2005): 246) suggestion that internal and external attribution mutually exclude one another. 
Contrary to this suggstion, both types of crime attribution prove not to affect support of 
repression inversely and the correlation between both types of attribution proves positive 
rather than negative (r=0.32; p<0.001, not shown in Table 6). 
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Table 1. Results of factor and reliability analysis on items indicating support of repression 
(N=1,652; percentages, factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha).*
 
 % (strongly) agree  
 
• If judges would render higher penalties, we would have 
fewer criminals. 
• Long prison sentences are a good solution for criminality. 
• Severe penalties deter potential felons. 
• A tough approach is needed in order to prevent crime. 
• Minors committing serious crimes should be punished just 
like adults. 
• The death penalty should be reinstalled. 
 
 
 
51.6 
51.0 
58.9 
84.1 
 
61.6 
21.3 
 
 
0.85 
0.81 
0.80 
0.73 
 
0.66 
0.64 
Cronbach’s α  0.84 
 
                                                 
*. All items translated from Dutch into English. 
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Table 2. Results of factor and reliability analysis on items indicating support of rehabilitation 
(N=1,520; percentages, factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha). 
 
 % (strongly) agree  
 
Life chances 
• Offering good educational opportunities prevents people 
from wrongdoing. 
• It is good that perpetrators of sex crimes are being treated 
psychologically. 
• More and better detoxification centers should be provided 
for addicted criminal. 
• Social services ought to tutor youth that has encountered 
judiciary much more intensive. 
 
Social integration 
• Parents ought to be accounted for their responsibilities 
consequently in order to prevent juvenile delinquents from 
recidivating. 
• Confronting perpetrators with the sufferings of their 
victims forecloses that they relapse. 
• Judiciary should make the effort to forestall that ex 
convicts feel excluded from community. 
• Support of family and friends is indispensable in order to 
preclude crime. 
 
Raising norms and values 
• Re-education is an effective instrument for solving crime. 
• Developing consciousness of norms is a very important 
form of crime prevention. 
• Judiciary ought to convince criminals that they drift astray. 
• Community service orders raise the feeling of 
responsibility of convicts. 
 
 
 
 
59.5 
 
85.9 
 
70.4 
 
89.9 
 
 
 
 
87.3 
 
62.1 
 
48.9 
 
79.2 
 
 
 
71.0 
 
89.2 
86.5 
 
54.4 
 
 
 
0.57 
 
0.56 
 
0.56 
 
0.50 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
 
0.47 
 
0.46 
 
0.45 
 
 
 
0.63 
 
0.58 
0.55 
 
0.47 
Cronbach’s α  0.75 
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Table 3. Results of factor and reliability analysis on items indicating support of decriminalization 
(N=1,510; percentages, factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha). 
 
 % (strongly) agree  
 
• Preventive searching ought to be prohibited.  
• The implementation of the identification duty will result in 
unnecessary and unjust convictions. 
• America violates the foundations of the constitutional state 
by detaining suspects of terrorism for years without a 
formal indictment. 
• Judiciary ought to be granted better opportunities to connect 
data files.* 
• Revealing suspects of sex crimes on the Internet causes 
cruel misunderstandings. 
• We ought to legalize drug trade in our country because it 
will solve a large part of all criminality at once. 
•  
 
8.7 
 
13.6 
 
 
59.9 
 
85.6 
 
50.5 
 
31.1 
 
0.73 
 
0.62 
 
 
0.53 
 
0.52 
 
0.51 
 
0.47 
Cronbach’s α  0.56 
 
* Item reversed. 
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Table 4. Correlations between the support for repression, rehabilitation, and decriminalization 
(Pearson’s correlations). 
 Repression Rehabilitation Decriminalization 
 
Repression 
Rehabilitation 
Decriminalization 
 
 
1.00 
-0.06 
-0.52* 
 
 
1.00 
0.05 
 
 
 
1.00 
 
* p<0.001 
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Table 5. Support for repression, rehabilitation, and decriminalization by political party 
preference (analysis of covariance, means).
 
Party preference % Repression Rehabilitation Decriminalization 
 
Christian Democrats 
Conservatives 
Orthodox Christians 
Rightist Populists 
Liberal Democrats 
Social Democrats 
Socialists 
Greens 
 
 
17.3 
14.2 
8.4 
6.4 
4.7 
24.4 
12.6 
11.5 
 
3.45 
3.72 
3.65 
4.05 
3.20 
3.19 
3.21 
2.84 
 
4.03 
3.94 
4.05 
3.89 
4.01 
3.95 
4.01 
4.02 
 
2.48 
2.41 
2.35 
2.40 
2.75 
2.85 
2.88 
3.13 
Total mean 
N 
η2 
R2
 
99.7 
3.37 
1,334 
15.5* 
24.2 
3.98 
1,339 
1.2 
7.0 
2.68 
1,334 
17.5* 
19.6 
 
* p<0.001 
a  Controlled for age, level of urbanization, gender, and educational level, victimization, and fear 
of victimization.
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Table 6. Explanation of support of repression, rehabilitation, and decriminalization (multiple 
regression, betas). 
 
 Repression Rehabilitation Decriminalization 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Authoritarianism 
Internal attribution 
External attribution 
Victimization 
Fear of victimization 
Age 
Urbanity 
Gender 
Education 
0.41* 
- 
- 
-0.06 
0.10* 
-0.18* 
-0.12* 
-0.08 
-0.09* 
0.29* 
0.22* 
-0.02 
-0.05 
0.08 
-0.18* 
-0.11* 
-0.08* 
-0.09* 
0.00 
- 
- 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.22* 
0.04 
0.12* 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.14* 
0.29* 
0.01 
-0.03 
0.25* 
0.03 
0.11* 
-0.04 
-0.18* 
- 
- 
0.00 
-0.09 
0.12* 
0.10* 
0.01 
0.04 
-0.12* 
-0.10 
-0.02 
-0.00 
-0.08 
0.12* 
0.10* 
0.02 
0.04 
N 
R2
1,667
23.9 
1,603
27.1 
1,675
5.6 
1,612 
13.5 
1,668
6.5 
1,601
7.4 
 
p <  0.001 
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